The United States mandated a Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) food safety standard for seafood in 1997. Panel model results for the period 1990 to 2004 suggest that HACCP introduction had a negative and significant impact on overall seafood imports from the top 33 suppliers. While the effect for developed countries was positive, the negative HACCP effect for developing countries supports the view of "standards-as-barriers" versus "standards-as-catalysts." When the effect is analyzed at an individual country level a different perspective emerges. Regardless of development status, leading seafood exporters generally gained sales volume with the U.S., while most other smaller trading partners faced losses or stagnant sales.
We evaluate these two hypotheses by analyzing the impact of mandatory HACCP measures introduced in 1997 on imports to the U.S. by the 35 largest seafood exporting countries, of which 27 are developing and 8 developed countries. The data set includes the pre-HACCP period 1990-1997 and the post-HACCP period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . We test the hypotheses by analyzing the overall impact of HACCP adoption on U.S. seafood imports and whether there was a differential effect for developed and developing country exporters over time. We then test for HACCP trade effects at the individual country level, allowing for differential effects not categorized by development status. Our results contribute to the discussion of the impact of changing food safety standards on the competitiveness of developing countries in international trade and especially of the dynamics of market share distribution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on food safety with an emphasis on empirical studies of the potential impact of increased food safety standards on international trade and the seafood market. Section 3 outlines recent developments in U.S. seafood trade and the implications of adoption of the HACCP system. Section 4 introduces the econometric gravity equation approach, followed by the description of the panel data set. Results are discussed in Section 5 and conclusions in the final section.
Food Safety and Trade: Empirical Evidence
There is a fairly extensive literature on the general effects of food safety standards and the SPS Agreement on developing countries (see, e.g., Henson, Brouder, and Mitullah 2000; Buzby 2003; Garcia-Martinez and Poole 2004; Josling, Roberts, and Orden 2004; World Bank 2005) . In addition, Pinstrup-Andersen (2000) , Unnevehr (2000 Unnevehr ( , 2003 , Jaffee and Henson (2004) , Henson and Mittulah (2004) , Maertens and Swinnen (2006) and Caswell and Bach (Forthcoming) have discussed the implications of major differences among food safety standards under the SPS Agreement from the point of view of developing countries. These authors agree that stricter national and international food safety measures may amount to protectionist non-tariff barriers to trade for many developing countries. Jaffee and Henson (2004) and the World Bank (2005) argue that standards can act to impede trade flows by explicit bans but more probably through prohibitive costs of compliance, particularly for poorer countries. The inevitable investment and recurrent 'costs of compliance' to penetrate high income markets could undermine the competitive position of many developing countries or narrow the profitability of high-value food exports. However, Jaffee and Henson (2004) and the World Bank (2005) highlight potential opportunities arising from developments in standards. Certain countries may be able to use the new standards environment to their competitive advantage and increase their market shares in trade. This possibility depends on closing gaps between growing consumer and standards requirements in developed countries and the modernization of supply chain structures in export oriented industries in developing countries. Jaffee and Henson conclude that the simple black and white argument between food safety "standards-as-barriers" and "standards-as-catalysts" is more complex in reality. The issue requires close analysis of the dynamics of particular markets, products, and countries in order to understand how changing food safety standards affect exports from developing countries.
To date only a few contributions in the economics literature have used empirical data to estimate the impact of national and international food safety regulations on trade flows (Paarlberg and Lee 1998; Calvin and Krissoff 1998; Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh 2001; Wilson and Otsuki 2004; Maskus, Otsuki, and Wilson 2005; Peterson and Orden 2005) . A common result is that changes in food safety regulations and more stringent safety standards set by developed countries tend to deter trade supporting the view of "standards-as-barriers." Overall, changes in trade patterns related to standards take place within the context of broader changes. For example, Carrere (2006) However, the results suggest the compliance strategies of firms are largely influenced by the threat of inspection of sanitary standards for seafood. Debaere (2005) investigates the impact of changing trade policies, in particular the EU zero tolerance policy for antibiotics, on the global shrimp market. The author shows empirically that the EU policy, mainly the loss of Thailand's preferential status in the EU, enforced differences in international safety standards for shrimp leading to a disruption of trade flows from Europe towards the U.S. This trade friction led to a significant decrease in U.S. shrimp prices and caused a U.S. anti-dumping case against six Asian shrimp exporting countries. Finally, Peridy, Guillotreau, and Bernard (2000) apply a panel model to analyze the economic factors affecting seafood imports into France. However, the influence of food safety standards is not central because the impact of trade barriers is reflected in a very broad manner that does not account for the effects of safety regulations.
Empirical work on the implications of increased food safety standards contributes to the understanding of the economic determinants that affect trade in fishery products.
However, whether these standards operate predominantly as barriers or catalysts is largely unresolved. Much of the analysis of U.S. HACCP requirements for seafood has focused on domestic implications, such as the costs and benefits of HACCP adoption.
The analysis here estimates the magnitude of import changes emerging from stricter food safety standards in the form of mandatory HACCP requirements and provides direct tests of the hypotheses of "standards-as-barriers" versus "standards-as-catalysts" for developing country exports.
U.S. Seafood Trade, International Food Safety, and HACCP
Although the United States is one of the world's largest exporters of seafood, its annual trade deficit in fishery products has been rising to nearly $8 billion in the past 15 years (NMFS 2005b) . Seafood from foreign countries is filling a growing share of the United In 1997, a mandatory HACCP requirement replaced the prior regulatory system for the seafood industry in the United States. At the time of its implementation, HACCP was seen as a win-win proposition, even though companies had to incur additional costs Swann, Temple, and Shurmer (1996) ; van Beers and van den Bergh (1997);
Peridy, Guillotreau, and Bernard (2000); and Wilson and Otsuki (2004) Moreover, an econometric approach does not predetermine the direction of the effect of standards, in particular with regard to food safety standards, and other trade determinants.
Thus it can be used for various hypothesis tests. The general gravity model is specified as: We hypothesize that all else equal adoption of the HACCP standard has had a negative impact on U.S. seafood imports, while increases in GDP have had a positive impact. The size of the exporting country's economy (Size or Export) is hypothesized to have a positive impact, while the foreign exchange rate to the U.S. Dollar Exchange is expected to show a negative sign. The impact of geographical Distance is hypothesized to be negative. All other signs are ambiguous; there are different hypotheses on the influence of time, trade agreements, and geographical connection.
Empirical Analysis of HACCP Effects on Seafood Imports
The panel of fishery product import data is estimated across 33 exporting countries for Consequently, random effects estimators are more appropriate given the importance of the distance variable for trade flow analysis. There are good reasons for arguing that country-specific fixed effects come to the fore especially when stricter food standards may boost or hamper trade flows across countries. Of course, such factors are deterministically linked with individual country specifics, which may not be considered as random. While Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001) ; Wilson and Otsuki (2004); and Blind and Jungmittag (2005) apply fixed effects models, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) and Peridy, Guillotreau, and Bernard (2000) , among others, doubt the appropriateness of such models in trade flow analysis. This is especially the case, when time invariant geographical distance variables are included in gravity equations, which is the most prominent example. Table 2 presents estimation results for Models 1-3 in two groups. The first uses dollar value of imported seafood as the dependent variable, while the second uses the volume of imported seafood. The random effects estimates of the gravity models are generally well behaved. Double-logarithmic specifications generated the best parameter estimates in all models and allow for the direct interpretation of coefficient elasticities. Statistically significant F-tests reject the null hypothesis of equivalence of OLS and fixed-effects models at the 95-percent level. Fixed-effects models were largely outperformed by random-effects models as indicated by the Hausman tests.
Overall Effects of HACCP Implementation
The results presented in Table 2 support the hypothesis that, all else equal, mandatory HACCP implementation had an overall negative and significant effect on seafood imports into the United States. The elasticities of HACCP effects across model specifications are calculated from the estimated model coefficients for this dummy variable using the procedure proposed by Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) The impact of geographical connections shows that Latin-American countries (Geo1) have better access overall to the U.S. seafood market compared to the residual group of northern countries, which is dominated by European fishery nations. Their export advantage is 1.7 percent in value of product and 2.5 percent in export volume. In contrast, the group of Asian/Pacific countries (Geo2) has a smaller positive competitive advantage compared to their European competitors.
Developing and Developed Country Effects of HACCP Implementation
To specifically address the "standards-as-barriers" versus "standards-as-catalysts" views, Moreover, the results do not show that the negative effect for developing countries began to be mitigated in the longer run; the HACPP effects for the two periods do not show a significant difference. Overall, the results based on comparisons of developing versus developed countries as groups support the hypothesis of "standards as barriers."
Country-Specific Effects of HACCP Implementation
While the previous results support the "standards-as-barriers" hypothesis, these results may mask differences in country-level effects within the developing and developed country groups. Henson, Brouder, and Mitullah (2000) and Henson and Mittulah (2004) suggest that a number of seafood exporting countries have experienced considerable problems of complying with food safety requirements. At the same time, other countries have managed to comply and increase market shares in high-value markets despite the existence and enforcement of stricter standards.
We estimated pooled time-series cross-section regressions of the country-level effects of HACCP requirements using the benchmark Model 1 by combining the random and fixed HACCP effects of the 33 countries exporting to the U.S. This allows estimation of the country-specific impact of HACCP enforcement, accounting for the combined random-and fixed-effect impact of HACCP on each country when other major determinants of seafood trade are controlled. Table 4 shows country-level pre-HACCP seafood imports and estimates of the short-run (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) and long run (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) trade flow effects of HACCP. These effects are heterogeneous among developing and developed countries, and in some cases in the short versus the long run. Comparison of short-and long-term effects at the country level underscores that the aggregate analysis that shows developing countries losing and developed countries gaining under HACCP may be misleading. Among the 25 developing countries that were in the top 33 exporters to the U.S., 10 showed long-term gains and 15 showed losses under HACCP, all else equal. As noted, gainers are concentrated among large exporters and losers among small exporters. Among these smaller exporters, the magnitudes of negative trade flow effects across developing countries range from -$6.9 to -$44.8 million based on the 1997 pre-HACCP export values of seafood products. Meanwhile, among the 8 developed countries 6 showed gains and 2 losses in the long-run.
While the HACCP effect for developed countries was predominantly positive, developing countries had a mixed experience. Considered on a country level, neither the "standards-as-barriers" or "standards-as-catalysts" hypothesis fits developing countries as a whole. Instead, the data suggest that among developing countries increased standards act as a catalyst for larger, more established exporting countries and a barrier for smaller exporters. To our knowledge, this analysis is the first to present estimates of the countryspecific impacts of stricter food-safety standards across a broad panel of bilateral trade relations with the U.S. Analyzing trade effects at a disaggregate, country level provides valuable information on the impacts of stricter food-safety regulations that is not available from a more aggregate analysis.
Conclusions
Foodborne safety risks associated with domestic and imported seafood products Leamer (1994, p.114) . ***, ** and * statistically significant at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. Results are corrected for first-order serial correlation. t-statistics (in parentheses) computed using White's heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. *** , ** and * statistically significant at the 99%-, 95%-and 90%-level, respectively. 
